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Abstract
Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to carefully
crafted adversarial examples, and these malicious samples
often transfer, i.e., they remain adversarial even against
other models. Although great efforts have been delved into
the transferability across models, surprisingly, less atten-
tion has been paid to the cross-task transferability, which
represents the real-world cybercriminal’s situation, where
an ensemble of different defense/detection mechanisms need
to be evaded all at once. In this paper, we investigate
the transferability of adversarial examples across a wide
range of real-world computer vision tasks, including image
classification, object detection, semantic segmentation, ex-
plicit content detection, and text detection. Our proposed
attack minimizes the “dispersion” of the internal feature
map, which overcomes existing attacks’ limitation of re-
quiring task-specific loss functions and/or probing a target
model. We conduct evaluation on open source detection and
segmentation models as well as four different computer vi-
sion tasks provided by Google Cloud Vision (GCV) APIs, to
show how our approach outperforms existing attacks by de-
grading performance of multiple CV tasks by a large margin
with only modest perturbations (l∞ ≤ 16).
1. Introduction
Recent progress in adversarial machine learning has
brought the weaknesses of deep neural networks (DNNs)
into the spotlight, and drawn the attention of researchers
working on security and machine learning. Given a deep
learning model, it is easy to generate adversarial examples
(AEs), which are close to the original input, but are easily
misclassified by the model [9, 37]. More importantly, their
effectiveness sometimes transfers, which may severely hin-
der DNN-based applications especially in security critical
scenarios [24, 13, 40]. While such problems are alarming,
little attention has been paid to the threat model of commer-
∗Equal contribution
Figure 1: Real-world computer vision systems deployed in
safety- and security-critical scenarios usually employ an ensemble
of detection mechanisms that are opaque to attackers. Cybercrim-
inals are required to generate adversarial examples that transfer
across tasks to maximize their chances of evading the entire detec-
tion systems.
cially deployed vision-based systems, wherein deep learn-
ing models across different tasks are assembled to provide
fail-safe protection against evasion attacks. Such a threat
model turns out to be quite different from those models that
have been intensively studied by aforementioned research.
Cross-task threat model. Computer vision (CV) based
detection mechanisms have been deployed extensively in
security-critical applications, such as content censorship
and authentication with facial biometrics, and readily avail-
able services are provided by cloud giants through APIs
(e.g., Google Cloud Vision [1]). The detection systems
have long been targeted by evasive attacks from cybercrim-
inals, and it has resulted in an arm race between new at-
tacks and more advanced defenses. To overcome the weak-
ness of deep learning in an individual domain, real-world
CV systems tend to employ an ensemble of different detec-
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tion mechanisms to prevent evasions. As shown in Fig. 1,
underground businesses embed promotional contents such
as URLs into porn images with sexual content for illicit on-
line advertising or phishing. A detection system, combining
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) and image-based ex-
plicit content detection, can thus drop posted images con-
taining either suspicious URLs or sexual content to miti-
gate evasion attacks. Similarly, a face recognition model
that is known to be fragile [36] is usually protected by a
liveness detector to defeat spoofed digital images when de-
ployed for authentication. Such ensemble mechanisms are
widely adopted in real-world CV deployment.
To evade detection systems with uncertain underlying
mechanisms, attackers turn to generating adversarial ex-
amples that transfer across CV tasks. Many adversar-
ial techniques on enhancing transferability have been pro-
posed [42, 40, 24, 13]. However, most of them are designed
for image classification tasks, and rely on task-specific loss
functions (e.g., cross-entropy loss), which limits their effec-
tiveness when transferred to other CV tasks.
To provide a strong baseline attack to evaluate the ro-
bustness of DNN models under the aforementioned threat
model, we propose a new succinct method to generate ad-
versarial examples, which transfer across a broad class of
CV tasks, including classification, object detection, seman-
tic segmentation, explicit content detection, and text detec-
tion and recognition. Our approach, called Dispersion Re-
duction (DR) and illustrated in Fig. 2, is inspired by the im-
pact of “contrast” on an image’s perceptibility. As lowering
the contrast of an image would make the objects indistin-
guishable, we presume that reducing the “contrast” of an
internal feature map would also degrade the recognizabil-
ity of objects in the image, and thus could evade CV-based
detections.
We use dispersion as a measure of “contrast” in feature
space, which describes how scattered the feature map of
an internal layer is. We empirically validate the impact of
dispersion on model predictions, and find that reducing the
dispersion of internal feature map would largely affect the
activation of subsequent layers. Based on additional ob-
servation that lower layers detect simple features [21], we
hypothesize that the low level features extracted by early
convolution layers share many similarities across CV mod-
els. By reducing the dispersion of an internal feature map,
the information that is in the feature output becomes indis-
tinguishable or useless, and thus the following layers are not
able to obtain any useful information no matter what kind
of CV task is at hand. Thus, the distortions caused by dis-
persion reduction in feature space, are ideally suited to fool
any CV model, whether designed for classification, object
detection, semantic segmentation, text detection, or other
vision tasks.
Based on these observations, we propose and build the
DR as a strong baseline attack to evaluate model robust-
ness against black box attacks, which generate adversarial
examples using simple and readily-available image classi-
fication models (e.g., VGG-16, Inception-V3 and ResNet-
152), whose effects extend to a wide range of CV tasks.
We evaluate our proposed DR attack on both popular open
source detection and segmentation models, as well as com-
mercially deployed detection models on four Google Cloud
Vision APIs: classification, object detection, SafeSearch,
and Text Detection (see §4). ImageNet, PASCAL VOC2012
and MS COCO2017 datasets are used for evaluations. The
results show that our proposed attack causes larger drops
on the model performance compared to the state-of-the-art
attacks ( MI-FGSM [13], DIM [40] and TI [14]) across
different tasks. We hope our finding to raise alarms for
real-world CV deployment in security-critical applications,
and our simple yet effective attack to be used as a bench-
mark to evaluate model robustness. Code is available at:
https://github.com/anonymous0120/dr.
Contributions. The contributions of this work include
the following:
• This work is the first to study adversarial machine
learning for cross-task attacks. The proposed attack,
called dispersion reduction, does not rely on labeling
systems or task-specific loss functions.
• Evaluation shows that the proposed DR attack beats
state-of-the-art attacks in degrading the performance
of object detection and semantic segmentation mod-
els and four different GCV API tasks by a large mar-
gin: 52% lower mAP (detection) and 31% lower mIoU
(segmentation) compared to the best of the baseline at-
tacks.
• Code and evaluation data are all available at an
anonymized GitHub repository [7].
2. Related Work
Adversarial examples [37, 17] have recently been shown
to be able to transfer across models trained on different
datasets, having different architectures, or even designed for
different tasks [24, 39]. This transferability property moti-
vates the research on black-box adversarial attacks.
One notable strategy, as demonstrated in [30, 29], is to
perform black-box attacks using a substitute model, which
is trained to mimic the behavior of the target model by dis-
tillation technique. They also demonstrated black-box at-
tacks against real-world machine learning services hosted
by Amazon and Google. Another related line of research,
a.k.a. gradient-free attack, uses feedback on query data, i.e.
soft predictions [38, 19] or hard labels [8] to construct ad-
versarial examples.
The limitation of the aforementioned works is that they
all require (some form of) feedback from the target model,
Figure 2: DR attack targets on the dispersion of feature map
at a specific layer of feature extractors. The adversarial exam-
ple generated by minimizing dispersion at conv3.3 of VGG-
16 model also distorts feature space of subsequent layers (e.g.,
conv5.3), and its effectiveness transfers to commercially de-
ployed GCV APIs.
which may not be practical in some scenarios. Recently,
several methods have been proposed to improve transfer-
ability by studying the attack generation process itself, and
our method falls into this category. In general, an iterative
attack [9, 20, 28] achieves higher attack success rate than
a single-step attack [17] in white-box setting, but performs
worse when transferred to other models. The methods men-
tioned below reduce the overfitting effect by either improv-
ing the optimization process or by exploiting data augmen-
tation.
MI-FGSM. Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign
Method (MI-FGSM) [13] integrates momentum term into
the attack process to stabilize update directions and escape
poor local maxima. The update procedure is as follows:
x′t+1 = x
′
t + α · sign(gt+1)
gt+1 = µ · gt + 5xJ(x
′
t, y)
‖ 5xJ(x′t, y) ‖1
(1)
The strength of MI-FGSM can be controlled by the momen-
tum and the number of iterations.
DIM. Momentum Diverse Inputs Fast Gradient Sign
Method (DIM) combines momentum and input diversity
strategy to enhance transferability [40]. Specifically, DIM
applies image transformation, T (·), to the inputs with a
probability p at each iteration of iterative FGSM to alleviate
the overfitting phenomenon. The update procedure is simi-
lar to MI-FGSM, the only difference being the replacement
of Eq. (1) by:
x′t+1 = Clip

x{x′t + α · sign(5xL(T (x′t+1; p), ytrue)}
(2)
where T (x′t, p) is a stochastic transformation function that
performs input transformation with probability p.
TI. Rather than optimizing the objective function at a
single point, Translation-Invariance (TI) [15] method uses
a set of translated images to optimize an adversarial exam-
ple. By approximation, TI calculates the gradient at the un-
translated image xˆ and then average all the shifted gradients.
This procedure is equivalent to convolving the gradient with
a kernel composed of all the weights.
The major difference between our proposed method and
the three aforementioned attacks is that our method does
not rely on task-specific loss functions (e.g. cross-entropy
loss or hinge loss). Instead, it focuses on low-level features,
which are presumably task-independent and shared across
different models. This is especially critical in the scenario,
where the attackers do not know the specific tasks of target
models. Our evaluation in §4 demonstrates improved trans-
ferability generated by our method across several different
real-world CV tasks.
3. Methodology
To construct AEs against a target model, we first estab-
lish a source model as the surrogate, to which we have ac-
cess. Conventionally, the source model is established by
training with examples labeled by the target model. That
is, the inputs are paired with the labels generated from
the target model, instead of the ground truth. In this way,
the source model mimics the behavior of the target model.
When we construct AEs against the source model, they are
likely to transfer to the target model due to such connection.
In our framework, although a source model is still re-
quired, there is no need for training new models or query-
ing the target model for labels. Instead, a pretrained pub-
lic model could simply serve as the source model due to
the strong transferability of the AEs generated via our ap-
proach. For example, in our experiments, we use pretrained
VGG-16, Inception-v3 and Resnet-152, which are publicly
available, as the source model f . With f as the source
model, we construct AEs against it. Existing attacks perturb
input images along gradient directions5xJ that depend on
the definition of the task-specific loss function J , which not
only limits their cross-task transferability but also requires
ground-truth labels that are not always available. To mit-
igate these issues, we propose dispersion reduction (DR)
Algorithm 1 Dispersion reduction attack
Input: A classifier f , original sample x, feature map at
layer k; perturbation budget 
Input: Attack iterations T .
Output: An adversarial example x′ with ‖ x′ − x ‖∞ 6 
1: procedure DISPERSION REDUCTION
2: x′0 ← x
3: for t = 0 to T − 1 do
4: Forward x′t and obtain feature map at layer k:
Fk = f(x′t)|k (3)
5: Compute dispersion of Fk: g(Fk)
6: Compute its gradient w.r.t the input: 5xg(Fk)
7: Update x′t:
x′t = x
′
t −5xg(Fk) (4)
8: Project x′t to the vicinity of x:
x′t = clip(x
′
t,x− ,x+ ) (5)
9: return x′t
attack that formally defines the problem of finding an AE as
an optimization problem:
min
x′
g(f(x′, θ))
s.t. ‖ x′ − x ‖∞ 6 
(6)
where f(·) is a DNN classifier with output of intermediate
feature map, and g(·) calculates the dispersion. Our pro-
posed DR attack, detailed in Algorithm 1, takes a multi-
step approach that creates an AE by iteratively reducing
the dispersion of an intermediate feature map at layer k.
Dispersion describes the extent to which a distribution is
stretched or squeezed, and there can be different measures
of dispersion, such as the standard deviation, and gini coef-
ficient [27]. In this work, we choose standard deviation as
the dispersion metric due to its simplicity, and denote it by
g(·).
To explain why reducing dispersion could lead to valid
attacks, we propose a similar argument used in [17]. Con-
sider a simplified model where f(x) = a = (a1, . . . , an)
is the intermediate feature, and y = Wa is an affine trans-
formation of the feature (we omit the constant b for sim-
plicity), resulting the final output logits y = (y1, . . . , yk).
In other words, we decompose a DNN classifier into a fea-
ture extractor f(·) and an affine transformation. Suppose
the correct class is c, the logit yc of a correctly classified
example should be the largest, that is w>c a >> w
>
i a for
i 6= c, where wi is the ith row of W. This indicates wc and
a are highly aligned.
On the other hand, suppose our attack aims to reduce
the standard deviation of the feature a. The corresponding
adversarial examples x′ leads to a perturbed feature
f(x′) = a′ ≈ a− α ∂
∂a
Std(a)
= a− 2α(a− a¯1)/(√n− 1Std(a))
(7)
Where α depicts the magnitude of the perturbation on a, a¯
is the average of the entries of a, and 1 is a column vector
with 1 in each entry. Therefore, the change of the logit yc
due to adversarial perturbation is essentially
∆yc = −2α(w>c a−w>c 1a¯)/(
√
n− 1Std(a))
= −2α(w>c a− nw¯ca¯)/(
√
n− 1Std(a))
= −2α√n− 1Cov(wc,a)/Std(a) < 0
(8)
If we think each entry of a and wc as samples, the
Cov(wc,a) corresponds to the empirical covariance of
these samples. This suggests that as long as wc and a are
aligned, our attack can always reduce the logit of the correct
class. Note that α is approximately the product of the mag-
nitude of the perturbation on x and the sensitivity of f(·),
therefore the reduction of the logit could be large if f(·) is
sensitive, which is often the case in practice.
In general, yc could be any activation that is useful for
the task, which may not be classification. As long as yc
is large for natural examples, indicating a certain feature is
detected, it is always reduced by our attacks according to
the analysis above. Thus, our attack is agnostic to tasks and
the choice of loss functions.
4. Experimental Results
We compare our proposed DR attack with the state-of-
the-art black-box adversarial attacks on object detection
and semantic segmentation tasks (using publicly available
models), and commercially deployed Google Cloud Vision
(GCV) tasks.
4.1. Experimental Settings
Network Types: We consider Yolov3-DarkNet53 [34],
RetinaNet-ResNet50 [22], SSD-MobileNetv2 [23], Faster
R-CNN-ResNet50 [35], Mask R-CNN-ResNet50 [18] as
the target object detection models and DeepLabv3Plus-
ResNet101 [11], DeepLabv3-ResNet101 [10], FCN-
ResNet101 [25] as the target semantic segmentation mod-
els. All network models are publicly available, and de-
tails are provided in the Appendix. The source networks
for generating adversarial examples are VGG16, Inception-
v3 and Resnet152 with output image sizes of (224 × 224),
(299 × 299) and (224 × 224), respectively. For the evalu-
ation on COCO2017 and PASCAL VOC2012 datasets, the
mAP and mIoU are calculated as the evaluation metrics for
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Figure 3: Results of DR attack with different steps N . We can see that our DR attack outperforms all baselines even starting from
small steps (e.g. N = 20).
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Figure 4: Results of DR attack with different attack layers of
VGG16. We see that attacking the middle layers results in higher
drop in the performance compared to attacking top or bottom lay-
ers. At the same time, in the attacking process, the drop in std of
middle layers is also larger than the top and bottom layers. This
motivates us that we can find a good attack layer by looking at the
std drop during the attack.
detection and semantic segmentation, respectively. Due to
the mismatch of different models being trained with differ-
ent labeling systems (COCO / VOC), only 20 classes that
correspond to VOC labels are chosen from COCO labels if
a COCO pretrained model is tested on the PASCAL VOC
dataset or a VOC pretrained model is tested on the COCO
dataset. For the evaluation on ImageNet, since not all test
images have the ground truth bounding boxes and pixelwise
labels, the mAP and mIoU are calculated as the difference
between the outputs of benign / clean images and adversar-
ial images.
Implementation details: We compare our proposed
method with projected gradient descent (PGD) [28],
momentum iterative fast gradient sign method (MI-
FGSM) [12], diverse inputs method (DIM) [41] and
translation-invariant attacks (TI) [15]. As for the hyper-
parameters, the maximum perturbation is set to be  = 16
for all the experiments with pixel values in [0, 255]. For the
proposed DR attacks, the step size α = 4, and the num-
ber of training steps N = 100. For the baseline meth-
ods, we first follow the default settings in [41] and [15]
with α = 1 and N = 20 for PGD, MI-FGSM and DIM,
α = 1.6 and N = 20 for TI-DIM. Then, we apply the same
hyper-parameters (α = 4, N = 100) used with the pro-
posed method to all the baseline methods. For MI-FGSM,
we adopt the default decay factor µ = 1.0. For DIM and
TI-DIM, the transformation probability is set to p = 0.5.
4.2. Diagnostics
4.2.1 The effect of training steps N
We show the results of attacking SSD-ResNet50,
RetinaNet-ResNet50, SSD-MobileNet and Faster
RCNN-ResNet50 with different number of training
steps (N = {20, 100, 500}) based on MS COCO2017
validation set. We also compare the proposed DR attack
with multiple baselines, namely PGD, MI-FGSM, DIM,
TI-DIM. The results are shown in Fig. 3. In contrast to
the classification-based transfer attacks [13, 40, 14], we do
not observe over-fitting in cross-task transfer attacks for all
the tested methods. Therefore, instead of using N = 20,
which is the value used by the baseline attacks we compare
with, we can employ larger training steps (N=100), and
achieve better attacking performance at the same time. In
addition, we can see that our DR attack outperforms all
the state-of-the-art baselines for all the step size settings.
It should be noticed that DR attack is able to achieve
promising results at N = 20, and the results from the DR
attack, using 20 steps, are better than those of baseline
methods using 500 steps. This shows that our proposed DR
attack has higher efficiency than the baselines.
4.2.2 The effect of attack layer
We show the results of attacking different convolutional
layers of the VGG16 network with the proposed DR at-
tack based on PASCAL VOC2012 validation set. Fig. 4a,
shows the mAP for Yolov3 and faster RCNN, and mIoU for
Deeplabv3 and FCN. In Fig. 4b, we plot the standard devia-
tion (std) values before and after the DR attack together with
the change. As can be seen, attacking the middle layers of
VGG16 results in higher drop in the performance compared
to attacking top or bottom layers. At the same time, the
change in std for middle layers is larger compared to the top
and bottom layers. We can infer that for initial layers, the
budget  constrains the loss function to reduce the std, while
for the layers near the output, the std is already relatively
small, and cannot be reduced too much further. Based on
Detection Results Using Val. Images of
Yolov3
DrkNet
RetinaNet
ResNet50
SSD
MobileNet
Faster-RCNN
ResNet50
Mask-RCNN
ResNet50
COCO and VOC Datasets mAP mAP mAP mAP mAP
COCO/VOC COCO/VOC COCO/VOC COCO/VOC COCO/VOC
VGG16 PGD (α=1, N=20) 33.5 / 54.8 14.7 / 31.8 16.8 / 35.9 9.7 / 14.2 10.3 / 15.9
PGD (α=4, N=100) 21.6 / 38.7 7.2 / 14.6 7.9 / 18.2 4.9 / 6.4 5.7 / 9.7
MI-FGSM (α=1, N=20) 28.4 / 48.9 12.0 / 23.6 13.6 / 29.6 7.8 / 10.9 8.2 / 12.0
MI-FGSM (α=4, N=100) 19.0 / 35.0 5.8 / 10.6 7.0 / 19.1 4.4 / 5.0 4.8 / 7.1
DIM (α=1, N=20) 26.7 / 46.9 11.0 / 21.9 11.0 / 22.9 6.4 / 8.2 7.2 / 11.6
DIM (α=4, N=100) 20.0 / 37.6 6.2 / 13.0 6.5 / 14.9 4.1 / 5.0 4.6 / 6.7
TI-DIM (α=1.6, N=20) 25.8 / 41.4 9.6 / 17.4 10.4 / 19.9 6.5 / 7.5 7.4 / 9.2
TI-DIM (α=4, N=100) 19.5 / 33.4 7.7 / 13.1 7.5 / 16.7 4.0 / 5.2 4.8 / 6.6
DR (α=4, N=100)(ours) 19.8 / 38.2 5.3 / 8.7 3.9 / 8.2 2.5 / 2.8 3.2 / 5.1
InceptionV3 PGD (α=1, N=20) 46.8 / 67.5 23.9 / 51.8 25.2 / 47.4 27.0 / 45.7 27.5 / 48.7
PGD (α=4, N=100) 35.3 / 57.1 15.0 / 33.0 14.0 / 31.6 18.2 / 31.7 19.4 / 34.8
MI-FGSM (α=1, N=20) 42.0 / 63.9 20.0 / 44.3 20.9 / 43.5 22.8 / 39.3 23.7 / 42.9
MI-FGSM (α=4, N=100) 32.4 / 54.0 12.5 / 27.1 13.1 / 29.2 16.3 / 26.9 17.9 / 30.5
DIM (α=1, N=20) 32.5 / 54.5 12.9 / 27.5 13.9 / 29.7 14.2 / 24.0 16.3 / 27.7
DIM (α=4, N=100) 29.1 / 48.3 10.4 / 20.5 10.4 / 22.0 12.2 / 18.2 13.8 / 44.6
TI-DIM (α=1.6, N=20) 32.1 / 50.2 12.8 / 25.8 13.5 / 28.0 12.5 / 20.4 14.4 / 23.0
TI-DIM (α=4, N=100) 27.1 / 42.2 11.0 / 19.8 10.4 / 22.1 9.9 / 14.6 11.1 / 17.5
DR (α=4, N=100)(ours) 24.2 / 45.1 8.5 / 18.9 9.0 / 19.5 8.3 / 14.3 9.8 / 17.0
Resnet152 PGD (α=1, N=20) 39.4 / 62.0 19.1 / 42.9 19.9 / 41.6 13.8 / 19.4 15.0 / 22.0
PGD (α=4, N=100) 28.8 / 51.5 12.2 / 25.9 11.2 / 24.4 8.2 / 11.3 8.8 / 13.9
MI-FGSM (α=1, N=20) 35.1 / 58.1 15.8 / 36.2 16.7 / 35.8 11.1 / 16.3 12.2 / 18.1
MI-FGSM (α=4, N=100) 26.4 / 48.2 11.2 / 23.5 9.9 / 21.3 7.0 / 9.5 8.2 / 11.4
DIM (α=1, N=20) 28.1 / 50.3 12.2 / 26.3 11.0 / 23.9 7.0 / 10.6 7.9 / 12.6
DIM (α=4, N=100) 24.7 / 43.2 8.8 / 19.4 7.8 / 16.1 5.1 / 7.1 6.2 / 10.3
TI-DIM (α=1.6, N=20) 27.9 / 45.6 11.7 / 21.7 11.3 / 22.5 6.8 / 8.7 7.5 / 9.9
TI-DIM (α=4, N=100) 22.3 / 36.7 9.0 / 15.8 8.7 / 19.1 5.0 / 6.6 5.7 / 8.2
DR (α=4, N=100)(ours) 22.7 / 43.8 6.8 / 12.4 4.7 / 7.6 2.3 / 2.8 3.0 / 4.5
Table 1: Detection results using validation images of COCO2017 and VOC2012 datasets. Our proposed DR attack performs best on
25 out of 30 different cases and achieves 12.8 mAP on average over all the experiments. It creates 3.9 more drop in mAP compared to the
best of the baselines (TI-DIM: 16.7 mAP).
this observation, we choose one of the middle layers as the
target of the DR attack. More specifically, we attack conv3-
3 for VGG16, the last layer of group − A for inception-v3
and the last layer of 2nd group of bottlenecks(conv3-8-3)
for ResNet152 in the following experiments.
4.3. Open Source Model Experiments
We compare the proposed DR attack with the state-of-
the-art adversarial techniques to demonstrate the transfer-
ability of our method on public object detection and seman-
tic segmentation models. We use validation sets of Ima-
geNet, VOC2012 and COCO2017 for testing object detec-
tion and semantic segmentation tasks. For ImageNet, 5000
correctly classified images from the validation set are cho-
sen. For VOC and COCO, 1000 images from the validation
set are chosen. The test images are shared in github reposi-
tory: dispersion reduction test images [6].
The results for detection and segmentation on COCO and
VOC datasets are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respec-
tively. The results for detection and segmentation on the
ImageNet dataset are provided in the Appendix. We also
include the table for average results over all the datasets,
including the ImageNet, in the Appendix.
As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, our proposed
method (DR) achieves the best results on 36 out of 42 set
of experiments by degrading the performance of the target
model by a larger margin. For detection experiments, the
DR attack performs best on 25 out of 30 different cases and
for semantic segmentation 11 out of 12 different cases. For
detection, our proposed attack achieves 12.8 mAP on av-
erage over all the experiments. It creates 3.9 more drop
in mAP compared to the best of the baselines (TI-DIM:
16.7 mAP). For semantic segmentation, our proposed attack
achieves 20.0 mIoU on average over all the experiments. It
achieves 5.9 more drop in mIoU compared to the best of the
baselines (DIM: 25.9 mIoU).
To summarize the results on the ImageNet dataset pro-
vided in the Appendix, our proposed method (DR) achieves
the best results in 17 out of 21 sets of experiments. For
detection, our proposed attack achieves 7.4 relative-mAP
on average over all the experiments. It creates 3.8 more
drop in relative-mAP compared to the best of the baselines
(TI-DIM: 11.2). For semantic segmentation, our proposed
attack achieves 16.9 relative-mIoU on average over all the
experiments. It achieves 4.8 more drop in relative-mIoU
compared to the best of the baselines (TI-DIM: 21.7).
Seg. Results Using Val. Images of
DeepLabv3
ResNet-101
FCN
ResNet-101
COCO and VOC Datasets mIoU mIoU
COCO/VOC COCO/VOC
VGG16 PGD (α=1, N=20) 37.8 / 42.6 26.7 / 29.1
PGD (α=4, N=100) 22.3 / 24.0 17.1 / 18.1
MI-FGSM (α=1, N=20) 32.8 / 36.2 22.7 / 25.0
MI-FGSM (α=4, N=100) 19.9 / 21.6 22.0 / 16.5
DIM (α=1, N=20) 30.3 / 33.2 15.5 / 22.4
DIM (α=4, N=100) 21.2 / 23.7 16.2 / 16.9
TI-DIM (α=1.6, N=20) 29.9 / 31.1 21.9 / 23.0
TI-DIM (α=4, N=100) 23.8 / 24.7 18.9 / 19.2
DR (α=4, N=100)(ours) 17.2 / 21.8 12.9 / 14.4
IncV3 PGD (α=1, N=20) 49.4 / 56.0 36.8 / 40.1
PGD (α=4, N=100) 37.1 / 41.3 26.1 / 28.3
MI-FGSM (α=1, N=20) 44.2 / 51.1 32.4 / 35.4
MI-FGSM (α=4, N=100) 33.7 / 39.1 24.0 / 35.4
DIM (α=1, N=20) 35.7 / 40.4 24.9 / 27.2
DIM (α=4, N=100) 30.4 / 33.9 21.3 / 22.3
TI-DIM (α=1.6, N=20) 35.3 / 37.0 26.4 / 27.7
TI-DIM (α=4, N=100) 29.0 / 29.8 22.5 / 23.5
DR (α=4, N=100)(ours) 23.2 / 29.2 17.1 / 20.9
Res152 PGD (α=1, N=20) 45.2 / 50.2 30.7 / 34.6
PGD (α=4, N=100) 31.5 / 35.1 21.6 / 24.0
MI-FGSM (α=1, N=20) 39.9 / 43.9 26.4 / 29.9
MI-FGSM (α=4, N=100) 28.2 / 32.2 19.9 / 22.1
DIM (α=1, N=20) 31.3 / 35.5 22.3 / 23.9
DIM (α=4, N=100) 25.9 / 28.8 19.0 / 19.9
TI-DIM (α=1.6, N=20) 31.8 / 33.9 23.7 / 25.2
TI-DIM (α=4, N=100) 26.6 / 26.6 20.3 / 21.4
DR (α=4, N=100)(ours) 22.7 / 27.0 16.4 / 17.6
Table 2: Semantic Segmentation results using validation im-
ages of COCO2017 and VOC2012 datasets. Our proposed DR
attack performs best on 11 out of 12 different cases and achieves
20.0 mIoU on average over all the experiments. It achieves 5.9
more drop in mIoU compared to the best of the baselines (DIM:
25.9 mIoU).
4.4. Cloud API Experiments
We compare proposed DR attack with the state-of-the-art
adversarial techniques to enhance transferability on com-
mercially deployed Google Cloud Vision (GCV) tasks 1:
• Image Label Detection (Labels) classifies image into
broad sets of categories.
• Object Detection (Objects) detects multiple objects
with their labels and bounding boxes in an image.
• Image Texts Recognition (Texts) detects and recog-
nize text within an image, which returns their bounding
boxes and transcript texts.
1https://cloud.google.com/vision/docs
Figure 5: Visualization of images chosen from testing set and
their corresponding AEs generated by DR. All the AEs are gen-
erated on VGG-16 conv3.3 layer, with perturbations clipped by
l∞ ≤ 16, and they effectively fool the four GCV APIs as indicated
by their outputs.
• Explicit Content Detection (SafeSearch) detects
explicit content such as adult or violent content within
an image, and returns the likelihood.
Datasets. We use ImageNet validation set for test-
ing Labels and Objects, and the NSFW Data
Scraper [5] and COCO-Text [2] dataset for evaluating
against SafeSearch and Texts, respectively. We ran-
domly choose 100 images from each dataset for our evalua-
tion, and Fig. 5 shows sample images in our test set. Please
note that due to the API query fees, larger scale experiments
could not be performed for this part.
Experiment setup. To generate the AEs, We use nor-
mally trained VGG-16 and Resnet-152 as our source mod-
els, since Resnet-152 is commonly used by MI-FGSM and
DIM for generation [40, 13]. Since DR attack targets
a specific layer, we choose conv3.3 for VGG-16 and
conv3.8.3 for Resnet-152 as per the profiling result in
Table 3 and discussion in Sec. 4.2.2.
Attack parameters. We follow the default settings
in [13] with the momentum decay factor µ = 1 when im-
plementing the MI-FGSM attack. For the DIM attack, we
set probability p = 0.5 for the stochastic transformation
function T (x; p) as in [40], and use the same decay fac-
tor µ = 1 and total iteration number N = 20 as in the
vanilla MI-FGSM. For our proposed DR attack, we do not
rely on FGSM method, and instead use Adam optimizer
(β1 = 0.98, β2 = 0.99) with learning rate of 5e−2 to re-
duce the dispersion of target feature map. The maximum
perturbation of all attacks in the experiments are limited by
clipping at l∞ = 16, which is still considered less percepti-
ble for human observers [26].
Evaluation metrics. We perform adversarial attacks
only on single network and test them on the four black-box
GCV models. The effectiveness of attacks is measured by
Model Attack
Labels Objects SafeSearch Texts
acc. mAP (IoU=0.5) acc. AP (IoU=0.5) C.R.W2
baseline (SOTA)1 82.5% 73.2 100% 69.2 76.1%
VGG-16
MI-FGSM 41% 42.6 62% 38.2 15.9%
DIM 39% 36.5 57% 29.9 16.1%
DR (Ours) 23% 32.9 35% 20.9 4.1%
Resnet-152
MI-FGSM 37% 41.0 61% 40.4 17.4%
DIM 49% 46.7 60% 34.2 15.1%
DR (Ours) 25% 33.3 31% 34.6 9.5%
1 The baseline performance of GCV models cannot be measured due to the mismatch between original
labels and labels used by Google. We use the GCV prediction results on original images as ground
truth, thus the baseline performance should be 100% for all accuracy and 100.0 for mAP and AP. Here
we provide state-of-the-art performance [3, 4, 2, 5] for reference.
2 Correctly recognized words (C.R.W) [2].
Table 3: The degraded performance of four Google Cloud Vision models, where we attack a sin-
gle model from the left column. Our proposed DR attack degrades the accuracy of Lables and
SafeSearch to 23% and 35%, the mAP of Objects and Texts to 32.9 and 20.9, the word recog-
nition accuracy of Texts to only 4.1%, which outperform existing attacks.
the model performance under attacks. As the labels from
original datasets are different from labels used by GCV, we
use the prediction results of GCV APIs on the original data
as the ground truth, which gives a baseline performance of
100% relative accuracy or 100.0 relative mAP and AP re-
spectively.
Results. We provide the state-of-the-art results on each
CV task as reference in Table 3. As shown in Table 3,
DR outperforms other baseline attacks by degrading the tar-
get model performance by a larger margin. For example,
the adversarial examples crafted by DR on VGG-16 model
brings down the accuracy of Labels to only 23%, and
SafeSearch to 35%. Adversarial examples created with
the DR, also degrade mAP of Objects to 32.9% and AP
of text localization to 20.9%, and with barely 4.1% accuracy
in recognizing words. Strong baselines like MI-FGSM and
DIM, on the other hand, only cause 38% and 43% success
rate, respectively, when attacking SafeSearch, and are
less effective compared with DR when attacking all other
GCV models. The results demonstrate the better cross-task
transferability of the dispersion reduction attack.
Figure 5 shows example of each GCV model’s output
for original and adversarial examples. The performance of
Labels and SafeSearch are measured by the accuracy
of classification. More specifically, we use top1 accuracy
for Labels, and use the accuracy for detecting the given
porn images as LIKELY or VERY LIKELY being adult
for SafeSearch. The performance of Objects is given
by the mean average precision (mAP) at IoU=0.5. For
Texts, we follow the bi-fold evaluation method of ICDAR
2017 Challenge [2]. We measure text localization accuracy
using average precision (AP) of bounding boxes at IoU=0.5,
and evaluate the word recognition accuracy with correctly
recognized words (C.R.W) that are case insensitive.
When comparing the effectiveness of attacks on differ-
ent generation models, the results that DR generates adver-
sarial examples that transfer better across these four com-
mercial APIs still hold. The visualization in Fig. 5 shows
that the perturbed images with l∞ ≤ 16 well maintain their
visual similarities with original images, but fool the real-
world computer vision systems.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a Dispersion Reduction (DR)
attack to improve the cross-task transferability of adver-
sarial examples. Specifically, our method reduces the dis-
persion of intermediate feature maps by iterations. Com-
pared to existing black-box attacks, the results on MS
COCO, PASCAL VOC and ImageNet show that our pro-
posed method performs better on attacking black-box cross-
CV-task models. One intuition behind the DR attack is that
by minimizing the dispersion of feature maps, images be-
come ”featureless”. This is because few features can be
detected if neuron activations are suppressed by perturbing
the input (Fig. 2). Moreover, with the observation that low-
level features bear more similarities across CV models, we
hypothesize that the DR attack would produce transferable
adversarial examples when one of the middle convolution
layers is targeted. Evaluation on different CV tasks shows
that this enhanced attack greatly degrades model perfor-
mance by a large margin compared to the state-of-the-art
attacks, and thus would facilitate evasion attacks against
a different task model or even an ensemble of CV-based
detection mechanisms. We hope that our proposed attack
can serve as benchmark for evaluating robustness of fu-
ture defense mechanisms. Code is publicly available at:
https://github.com/anonymous0120/dr.
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A. Target models
The backbones and datasets of pretrained weights for tar-
get models are shown in Table 4.
Models Backbone Pretrained Dataset
Yolov3[34][33] DarkNet53 COCO
RetineNet[22][16] ResNet50 COCO
SSD[23][31] MobileNet COCO
Faster R-CNN[35][32] ResNet50 COCO
Mask R-CNN[18][32] ResNet50 COCO
DeepLabv3[10][32] ResNet101 sub COCO in VOC labels
FCN [25][32] ResNet101 sub COCO in VOC labels
Table 4: Backbone and pretrained dataset for target models.
B. Experiments on ImageNet
We have performed adversarial attacks on randomly cho-
sen 5000 correctly classified images from the ImageNet
validation set. The accuracies for detection and segmen-
tation are shown in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively. Since
there are no ground truth annotations and masks for the test
images, the performance metrics are selected as the rela-
tive mAP/mIoU for detection and semantic segmentation
respectively. In other words, the predictions from benign
samples are regarded as the ground truth and predictions
from adversarial examples are regarded as inference results.
Our proposed method (DR) achieves the best results in
17 out of 21 sets of experiments (81.0%) by degrading the
performance of the target model by a larger margin. For
detection, our proposed attack reduces the mAP, on aver-
age, to 7.41 over all the experiments. It creates 3.8 more
drop in mAP compared to the best of the baselines (TI-DIM:
11.2 mAP). For semantic segmentation, our proposed attack
achieves 16.93 mIoU on average over all the experiments.
It achieves 4.76 more drop in mIoU compared to the best of
the baselines (DIM: 21.69 mIoU).
Avg. Res. Det. Seg.mAP mIoU
COCO&VOC/ImageNet
PGD 26.1 / 19.1 33.6 / 28.8
MI-FGSM 22.8 / 15.6 30.6 / 25.2
DIM 18.6 / 11.5 25.9 / 21.8
TI-DIM 16.7 / 11.2 26.4 / 21.7
DR (Ours) 12.8 / 7.4 20.0 / 16.9
Table 5: Average results for detection and segmentation us-
ing COCO, VOC and ImageNet validation images.
C. Average Results
We have compared the proposed DR attack with the
state-of-the-art adversarial techniques to demonstrate the
transferability of our method on public object detection and
semantic segmentation models. We have used the validation
sets of ImageNet, VOC2012 and COCO for testing object
detection and semantic segmentation tasks. The average re-
sults can be seen in Table 5,
For COCO and VOC datasets, our proposed method
(DR) achieves the best results by degrading the perfor-
mance of the target model by a larger margin. For detection,
our proposed drops the mAP to 12.8 on average over all the
experiments. It creates 3.9 more drop in mAP compared to
the best of the baselines (TI-DIM: 16.7 mAP). For semantic
segmentation, our proposed attack causes the mIoU to drop
to 20.0 on average over all the experiments. It achieves 5.9
more drop in mIoU compared to the best of the baselines
(DIM: 25.9 mIoU).
The diagnostic of average results for ImageNet can be
seen in B.
D. Visualization
Figure 6 shows the visualization samples for the pro-
posed method and baselines attacks. Examples of detec-
tion and segmentation results for clean images, results for
benign images, proposed DR images, PGD images, MI-
FGSM images, DIM images and TI-DIM images are shown
in each column (starting from left), respectively. First two
rows are the detection results, and the last two rows are the
segmentation results. We can see that the proposed DR at-
tack is able to effectively perform vanishing attack to both
segmentation and detection tasks. It is also noted that the
proposed DR attack is more successful and effective, com-
pared to the baselines, when attacking and degrading the
performance for smaller objects.
Yolov3
DrkNet
RetinaNet
ResNet50
SSD
MobileNet
Faster-RCNN
ResNet50
Mask-RCNN
ResNet50
mAP mAP mAP mAP mAP
VGG16
PGD(α=1,N=20) 31.6 19.1 19.5 6.4 7.1
PGD(α=4,N=100) 18.7 7.0 7.7 2.8 3.3
MI-FGSM(α=1,N=20) 25.9 13.4 15.2 4.7 5.0
MI-FGSM(α=4,N=100) 16.4 5.0 6.6 1.8 2.2
DIM(α=1,N=20) 23.4 11.3 11.5 3.7 4.5
DIM(α=4,N=100) 17.2 5.8 6.3 2.2 2.7
TI-DIM(α=1.6,N=20) 21.5 10.2 11.6 3.5 4.0
TI-DIM(α=4,N=100) 16.3 7.8 8.6 2.3 2.7
DR(α=4,N=100)(ours) 17.0 3.6 4.1 1.2 1.5
InceptionV3
PGD(α=1,N=20) 51.3 36.6 33.9 25.9 25.1
PGD(α=4,N=100) 33.3 16.4 16.2 14.1 14.7
MI-FGSM(α=1,N=20) 44.6 27.4 27.5 19.8 20.1
MI-FGSM(α=4,N=100) 30.3 14.1 15.3 11.9 12.5
DIM(α=1,N=20) 30.6 15.2 16.4 11.0 11.7
DIM(α=4,N=100) 25.3 10.2 10.6 6.9 8.2
TI-DIM(α=1.6,N=20) 30.6 15.4 16.1 9.4 10.3
TI-DIM(α=4,N=100) 23.7 11.2 12.2 6.8 7.0
DR(α=4,N=100)(ours) 21.1 8.6 9.4 4.5 5.3
Resnet152
PGD(α=1,N=20) 40.8 27.6 27.0 10.4 10.8
PGD(α=4,N=100) 27.2 13.4 13.0 5.0 6.1
MI-FGSM(α=1,N=20) 33.9 20.3 21.2 7.6 8.0
MI-FGSM(α=4,N=100) 24.6 11.4 11.8 3.9 4.7
DIM(α=1,N=20) 26.9 13.2 13.0 4.4 5.3
DIM(α=4,N=100) 22.2 9.3 8.7 2.9 3.7
TI-DIM(α=1.6,N=20) 25.3 13.0 13.3 4.2 5.0
TI-DIM(α=4,N=100) 19.5 9.4 9.8 2.7 2.9
DR(α=4,N=100)(ours) 21.0 6.2 4.8 1.3 1.6
Table 6: Detection results for ImageNet.
DeepLabv3
ResNet101
FCN
ResNet101
mIoU mIoU
VGG16
PGD(α=1,N=20) 30.3 24.6
PGD(α=4,N=100) 17.5 15.1
MI-FGSM(α=1,N=20) 25.4 20.8
MI-FGSM(α=4,N=100) 15.5 13.9
DIM(α=1,N=20) 24.7 19.0
DIM(α=4,N=100) 17.1 14.5
TI-DIM(α=1.6,N=20) 23.8 20.0
TI-DIM(α=4,N=100) 18.3 16.5
DR(α=4,N=100)(ours) 16.5 12.4
InceptionV3
PGD(α=1,N=20) 47.3 37.5
PGD(α=4,N=100) 31.0 24.4
MI-FGSM(α=1,N=20) 40.5 31.8
MI-FGSM(α=4,N=100) 28.3 22.8
DIM(α=1,N=20) 30.4 24.4
DIM(α=4,N=100) 25.0 20.0
TI-DIM(α=1.6,N=20) 28.1 24.4
TI-DIM(α=4,N=100) 22.1 20.6
DR(α=4,N=100)(ours) 19.7 17.2
Resnet152
PGD(α=1,N=20) 39.5 31.1
PGD(α=4,N=100) 26.4 20.9
MI-FGSM(α=1,N=20) 33.5 26.3
MI-FGSM(α=4,N=100) 24.5 19.3
DIM(α=1,N=20) 26.8 21.0
DIM(α=4,N=100) 21.7 17.3
TI-DIM(α=1.6,N=20) 26.2 21.9
TI-DIM(α=4,N=100) 20.1 18.3
DR(α=4,N=100)(ours) 20.5 15.3
Table 7: Segmentation Results for ImageNet.
(a) Clean Data (b) Benign (c) DR (ours) (d) PGD (e) MI-FGSM (f) DIM (g) TI-DIM
Figure 6: Samples of Detection and Segmentation Results
